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INDO - CHINA

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FORM 100-100
(Rev. 7-27-64)

SECRETARIAT - ROUTE SLIP

TO	NAME	INITIALS
	C. C. Keering, Jr.	
	J. J. Womigan	
	H. J. Putrell, Jr.	
	B. Thum	
	D. C. Lee	
	J. W. Archinolese	
	W. E. Kantack	
	W. E. Wiley	
	P. F. Pugliese	
	A. W. Salloway	
	J. E. Bonovan	
	A. W. Asworth, Jr.	
	A. L. Dart	
	E. E. Hamilton	
	L. E. Houston	
	C. S. McClelland	
	J. L. McFerrall	
	J. E. Schooner, Jr.	
	Secretariat Files	
	Director's Files	
	C. G. C. Files	

Should change to Co's
series...

If not, please
forward.

(23695)

FORM 100-100
(Rev. 7-27-64)

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	Director's Files	
	C. G. C. Files	

I discussed this problem
in general with the Director
about ten days ago.

He said (1) Bd. of Review
is not to concern Board's
operations in advance. To
conclude. (2) They are to
review from past - future, and
(3) no exception to foregoing are to
be made by Director.

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

SECRETARIAT

To: E. J. Putzell, Jr. Lieut. (Jr.) USNR
 Room 1-4, Adm. Bldg.
 Assistant Executive Officer
From: Emerson Higelow

Subject: Indo-Chinese Currency Notes

Reference is made to memorandum sent to the Director by Stanley P. Lovell, Director of Research and Development Branch, dated September 11.

Reference is further made to your memorandum to Stanley Lovell dated September 12, 1944.

Under date of September 29, Mr. Lovell sent me copies of the above mentioned memoranda, expressing the opinion that the Special Funds Branch would be the more appropriate Agency to acquire this currency in view of the information in his memorandum to the Director of September 13.

The writer has had informal discussions with Lieut. Commander Taylor as to the future needs of Indo-Chinese planters. It is the writer's understanding from Lieut. Commander Taylor that the outside needs for 1st Detachments 101, 202 and 404 from November 1, 1944 to March 1, 1945 would be 500,000 Indo-Chinese planters, which, at the current official rate of 10 French francs for one planter, and with the present stabilized rate of 8.00 per French franc, is the equivalent of 400,000.

In order to obtain this Indo Chinese currency from the French through our Paris Office, I would ask you kindly to submit this matter to the Director for his approval. Upon receipt of the Director's approval, I shall inquire through the head of our Paris Office if he might approach the French and suggest that they take a run on their original planter and on their original paper to the total needed. I, of course, do not know at this time what the cost will be to us if no other means are successful, nor what form the repayment will take.

Your prompt attention to this matter is respectfully requested.

SECRET

SECRET

15748
Indochina
Bureau

Mr. Stanley P. Lovell

14 September 1944

Lt. Fussell

This is to inform you that the Acting Director has approved the suggestion made in your memorandum of 13 September 1944 to him entitled "Indo-Chinese Currency".

It is requested that your branch determine the amount of currency needed by the several operating branches and then communicate with the appropriate office in the field to arrange for the acquisition of the funds.

Lt. J. Fussell, Jr.
Lt. (j.g.) USNR
Assistant Executive
Officer

SECRET

**OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.**

13 September 1964

MEMORANDUM

SECRET

TO: The Director, OSS


FROM: Stanley P. Lovell

SUBJECT: Indo-Chinese Currency

At a conference which I had today with Lt. Cmdr. Ed Taylor, he stated that there was an urgent need for a supply of Indo-Chinese Piastres for operations out of 404.

The R & D Documentation Branch has thoroughly investigated this situation. All Indo-Chinese currency has been made in Paris, France by the Banc de France. The security of the currency is not so much the fine engraving and lithography as the very special portrait watermark. The production of this watermark, as was in the case of the Marianne watermark in the French franc, has been the secret of one French family for generations. They in turn serve only the Banc de France. Careful investigation shows that no manufacturer of watermarks in the United States or England knows how this is done or can reproduce it. In light of the above, I have instituted no work here on reproducing Indo-Chinese Piastres.

Now that we are in Paris, I suggest that proper French authorities be requested to sell us this currency made on the original plates and paper, rather than to have OSS turn out a discredibility.


Stanley P. Lovell
Director
Research and Development

SECRET

15 September 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR

TO: The Director, OSS

FROM: Stanley P. Lovell

SUBJECT: Indo-Chinese Currency

At a conference which I had today with Lt. Col. Ed Taylor, he stated that there was an urgent need for a supply of Indo-Chinese Piastres for operations out of 404.

The F.B.I. Documentation Branch has thoroughly investigated this situation. All Indo-Chinese currency has been made in Paris, France by the Banque de France. The security of this currency is not so much the fine engraving and lithography as the very special security watermark. The production of this watermark, as was in the case of the Marianne watermark in the French franc, has been the secret of one French family for generations. They do not give only the Banque de France. Careful investigation shows that no manufacturer of watermarks in the United States or England knows how this is done or can reproduce it. In light of the above, I have instituted no work here on reproducing Indo-Chinese Piastres.

Now that we are in Paris, I suggest that proper French authorities be requested to tell us this security side of the original plates and paper, rather than to have us turn out a discredibility.

Stanley P. Lovell

Director

Special Agent in Charge

STANLEY P. LOVELL

FROM: [REDACTED] (U)

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

2000

- report should be numbered to correspond with number in 7c column.
- should be typed across sheet under each comment.
- Identification should be used in 1c column.
- 1 hour should be initial (each mark insufficient) before further routing.
- initial or action taken should be indicated in Comments column.
- List should always be returned to Registry.
- see Designated for use separate sheet.

SECRET

to: Mr. Kntz **MR 20 20**

Please return to the
Director's Office the attached
memo when it has served your
purpose.



Director's Office

(9904)

SECRET**FOR INTELLIGENCE:**

I have been told on good authority that Admiral Decoux, Governor-General of Indo-China (and now in Indo-China) is representative of Vichy and is pro-Japanese. He was appointed by Vichy and has kept good relations with the Japanese. General Mordant, who is his Chief of Staff and opposed to him, is friendly to the Allies. The French in China have good relations with the French of Mordant's forces in Indo-China.

It has been arranged with Pechkoff that each is free to operate in Indo-China and will exchange information. Pechkoff states that a unit of five hundred French officers have been gathered for the purpose of setting up certain rallying points within Indo-China against the Japanese. This is in addition to the intelligence units that they are already sending in there. Colonel A has been directed to turn over all information to Colonel T. I am sure that this will be a valuable source of intelligence.

SECRET

To: Major Hoffman

I think that Coughlin and
others in the Far East should be
advised about this.

W.J.D.

*This was sent out
2 weeks ago*

Corr.
Director's Office

(3308)

To: Major Hoffman

General Donovan has asked
that these be sent on to you
and then returned for his
files.

*Ok you ' thanks
fellows' W.J.D.
Hoffman*

J. Tarrant

Director's Office

(3308)

2 March 1964

General Donovan

Re: Reply to General Tai Li

Commander Halliwell and Major Hoffman, among others, have suggested that it would be desirable if you reply to Tai Li in answer to the attached.

The Secretariat has made a draft which may give you something to work on.

The comments on the intelligence material are taken from the memorandum prepared by Dr. Wilbur of NSA.

C. A. Name

Attachments

In evaluating the attached intelligence report, R/A 4 offers the following observations:

The Annam report gives considerable information which is new, at least to our Indo-China specialists, although the alleged facts must be known in much greater detail by the French authorities. While the report presents systematically the anti-French and anti-Japanese and Communist organizations, with lists of leaders, it is quite vague about their activities.

The report reveals some details of activities of Chinese Communists in Annam but naturally does not even mention the Chinese-sponsored nationalist movements in Annam -- one backed by the Kuomintang and the other by a Chinese military group.

It fails to mention one of the most intelligent leaders of our nationalist party, Pham Quynh, who is not pro-Chinese.

Our reaction is that the Annam report has a curiosity value, but no military information.

SECRET

A SURVEY OF VARIOUS REVOLUTIONARY PARTIES IN ANNAM

Translation of a Chinese Intelligence Report

27 January 1944

Copy No. **4**

SECRET

A SURVEY OF VARIOUS REVOLUTIONARY PARTIES IN ANNAM

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SECRET

1. THE ANNAM REVOLUTIONARY ALLIANCE

A. Formation of the Alliance

The Alliance was formed by a union of various Annamese anti-French and anti-Japanese factions: the Annam National People's Party, the Annam Independence Party, the Annam National People's Revolutionary Self-determination Party, the Eastern Sea Revolutionary Alliance, the Annam Army of National Restoration, and the progressive members of the Greater Annam Party (whose leader is still pro-Japanese).

B. The Program of the Alliance

It is anti-French and anti-Japanese, and strives for the liberation of the Annamese people.

C. The Organization of the Alliance

The Alliance established a general assembly at Lau-chow [in Kwangsi] in October 1942. Its organizational system is as follows:

GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE ANNAMITE REVOLUTIONARY ALLIANCE

Annam Army of National
Restoration - Special
Training Group

Military Affairs Board
Political Affairs Board
Social Affairs Board

Chairman

Standing Committee

Chang Pei-kung* 張保公
Juan Hsi-ch'ou 阮海臣
Ju Sung-hsiang 阮洪卿

Commissioners

Chang Chang-feng 張中奉
Hsueh Ching-yu 許經猷
Yen Chi-tsu 嚴繼祖
Ch'en Pao 陳寶

Stations

Tung-hsing / Kwangtung /

Director: Li Hsing 李興
Executive Officer: Yen Chi-ming 嚴繼明

Ching-hsi / Kwangsi /

Executive Officer: Ch'en Pao

H'ui-ning / Yunnan /

Executive Officer: Ju
Hung-hsiang

Units

Mon Cay / Tonkin /

Ch'a-ku 茶古 unit
Ho-lo 胡樂 unit
Ch'ui lan 崔蘭 unit
Lan-ch'ou 蘭壽 unit

Hai-ning 海寧 register

Hsien-an 仙安
1st unit
2nd unit

Hsia-ch'ü 下居 unit
T'ien-hsia 天下 unit
Kung-liang 康良 unit
T'ang-hai 唐海 unit
Kuang-an 廣安 unit
Haiphong unit

Communications:
Between Mon Cay, Hanoi,
and Haiphong there is
an established network,
using liaison officers

Besides the kernel of small units, there are also in each country village and each school separately organized rural societies, youths' corps, women's corps, etc. which are organized on an extra-party basis.

* Romanization hereafter is according to Chinese sound, except for known Annamese equivalents.

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SECRETD. The Present Activity of the Alliance

1. The Alliance recently ordered each of the working stations to survey the organization, membership, and program of the various parties in Annam in order to announce the selection of delegates to come to Liu-chow [Kwangsi] to attend a representative consultative assembly.

2. The accomplishments of the Tung-hsing working station of the Assembly have been most superior, and the General Assembly especially ordered a motion of encouragement.

3. The Tung-hsing station of the Alliance has now decided to organize a military force.

II. THE SITUATION WITH REGARD TO THE ANNAM COMMUNIST PARTY

A. The leader of the Annam Communist Party is Li Kuang-hua 李光華. Important members are Chen Tung-hai 陳東海, Yang Hui-nan 楊煥南, Li Po-chieh 林伯傑, Huang Kuo-hun 黃國勳, Li Chung-po 李鍾波, and Chen Shan-hsiung 陳山雄. On the borders of Yunnan and Kwangsi, they summoned the people of Annam, in the names of such organizations as the Annam Independence Alliance, the Liberation Alliance, the National Salvation Society, and the United Anti-Monarchical Society, to take part in its extra-party group.

B. The important Communists Huang Kuo-hun and Li Chung-po recently summoned young men and women to participate in training in the Ko-ma and Ping-meng area [Lat. 23°, Long. 106°] along the border of Kwangsi. At the same time they dispatched a member to the border to buy at high prices our rifles and bullets.

C. The Annamese Communist Party periodically puts up posters inciting the Annamese people to rise and rebel against the French, resist Japan,

SECRET

and achieve liberty.

D. The Annamese Communist Party inquired on personnel matters of our Central Authorities in order to recruit and train youth in Annam.

E. Four important Chinese Communists, Shih Ch'en-nung 魏容傑, Ts'ai Hua 蔡華 and others, have already gone in great secrecy from Yunnan to Annam to tidy up their crippled section and mend their spirits.

III. THE PRESENT SITUATION IN REGARD TO THE PRO-JAPANESE PARTY IN

ANNAM

A. The Greater Annam National People's Party

The leader, Juan Hsiang-chih 阮祥之 [Nguyen?] (the traitor of Annam) has begun to show his claws and teeth. That Party was organized when the Japanese entered Annam. Each person who enters the party must register his name, address, and birthplace, to be reported to the Japanese, and contribute to Japanese demands. If anything unusual happens it is settled by the Japanese.

After the Japanese had entered Annam and their foundations had been stabilized, the traitor Juan was unceremoniously led out by the Japanese from his concealment. Before long the names of some fifty officials of that party were communicated by the Japanese to the French and were nearly all searched out and arrested.

B. The Monarchist Party

The leaders of the class of Bao Dai 保大 [Bao Dai?], Chu Chang 吳昌, [Quong De?], Juan Shih 阮世 [Nguyen?], and Hsin Kan 鄭幹, are all elderly useless officials. Quong De (Bao Dai's uncle) and Chu Chang 吳昌 are absolutely pro-Japanese. Bao Dai is the present

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King of Annam. Chu Chang is pro-French. Neither is favorable towards us [Chinese]. Quang De is at present receiving Japanese support. Taken together the whole group is hardly enough to fill the ministerial positions in the Imperial Court of King Bao Dai's household. They privately have a secret agreement with the Japanese. But most recently Bao Dai has also become closely pro-French, and has conferred on Decoux, the Governor-General of Annam, the title of Prince-Protector-of-the-State. The Japanese display great hate towards Bao Dai and are trying to arouse the Annamese people against their present King, Bao Dai.

C. The Greater Annam Party

This is a Japanese-directed party. Its leader, Juan Ten-ch'um 阮文春 Nguyen, is the eldest son of Quang De. He is also known as Ch'en H'uan-an 陳欽安, Ch'en Hai-sheng 希聖, or Ch'en Fu-min 福民. Recently he has regularly gone about in the Hanoi-Kao-p'ing 河內-高平 area, and been active there, receiving secret Japanese orders, for the purpose of organizing a puppet Annamese government. At present he is selecting his party managers for the purpose of worming their way into the activities of the various anti-Japanese parties, secretly plotting to sabotage their organization and activities.

D. The Annam Restoration Alliance

The Chairman, Ch'en Chung-li 陳中立, and the important "olows and teeth" Huang Liang 黃良, have already been bought out by the Japanese. They vigorously plot to sabotage various anti-Japanese parties. A month before they had been restrained. If there are other parties or scattered activities, most of them are utilized by the Japanese, continuing their sabotage of the organizations of various

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anti-Japanese parties and the United Nations agents in Annam.

IV. AN EXAMINATION OF THE REVOLUTION IN ANNAM

Annamese societies are extraordinarily complex. Their battle formation has not been unified. Consequently, successive revolutions failed and the French defeated each of them. Perhaps they were utilized by the Japanese. At present the various anti-French and anti-Japanese societies in Annam are united into an Alliance. Now the trend of events in Annam is developing by natural necessity. But while the lower ranks in the organization of the Annam Alliance are speeding the development, the top rank of leaders are still wrangling, thus creating a most turbulent and self-contradictory appearance. This is perhaps an unavoidable circumstance connected with the early days of the revolutions in the colony. The basic reasons are as follows:

1. Annam has been under French oppression for sixty years. Its culture has declined to the extent that it has not been able to produce a pure and upright, patriotic, determined, outstanding, talented, unyielding great leader; and this has created an inchoate situation like a crowd of dragons without a head.

2. Although the Annam Alliance has seized the Three Peoples' Principles to be its guiding revolutionary theory, it still lacks a clever manager. (These principles) cannot be directed toward the actual situation in Annam. To carry them out in toto would result in causing the highest revolutionary principles to be transformed into a hollow creed.

3. The Annamese people have received a slavery education and also for a long time have been dyed in the liberal habits of France. From

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SECRET

this they have become careless and lazy, changeful and shiftless, opportunistic and scheming, desultory in regard to law, wavering without moral or spiritual integrity. The resistance of the Annamites is not constant, they condescend to serve the enemy. Everything is based upon this one vile disposition.

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

INTEROFFICE MEMO

TO: Director, OSB

FROM: F. L. Mayer

SUBJECT: Attached report

October 20, 1943.

The attached information comes from our PBK source. In view of its ultra secret nature, we have not named the source in the accompanying paper, since we think you may wish to give the information to Admiral Leahy, for example, or the Joint Chiefs of Staff, etc. Since this is a new source, it would be helpful for us for the purpose of evaluation to learn any comment as to confirmation or otherwise.


F. L. M.

W. H. [unclear]

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From an enemy source which is considered accurate, we have received the following report dated October 1st:

The Japanese Commander in Thailand, Lieutenant General Nakamura, anticipates a possible attack on Indo-China in the direction of Hanoi, and expects that a strong pincers attack against the North will be launched at the termination of the rainy season. The General expects this attack to be effected by Chinese shock troops from southeast China, aimed at Bangkok and at the severing of lines from East to West, and directed through Lashio and Chiangmai.

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL**NOTE**

Indo China 11.77
 Calcutta 25
 x French
 x Poulis
 FF-3975
 x Resources
 x Burgin, Gms

L'Indochine est un pays de 30 millions d'habitants dont les leviers de commande gouvernementaux militaires et économiques se trouvaient encore, en octobre 1942, entre des mains françaises. L'ensemble de la collectivité indochinoise est, à l'unanimité, très anti-japonaise. Cela ne veut pas dire pro-allié dans la même proportion; mais cela veut dire, tout au moins avant les événements politiques et militaires du Nord Afrique

- pro-africain pour une vaste majorité
- pro-anglais pour une large part de la population
- anti-chinois pour une vaste majorité, si l'on entend

par anti-chinois des gens, se méfiant à priori du voisinage chinois et décidés en tout cas à s'opposer avec énergie à une action militaire chinoise, même "contrôlée" par les Alliés et même sous le motif désintéressé de combattre les Japonais.

Mais le fait essentiel du panorama politique reste encore le resserrément des liens affectueux et confiants entre les Français et les populations indochinoises.

Pour un pays d'Asie, l'Indochine est bien outillée en routes, chemins de fer et ports. Elle possède des établissements industriels capables de venir en aide efficacement aux services de l'arrière d'une armée moderne. Elle possède une armée de 40.000 hommes (après une mobilisation générale) qui, convenablement fournis par les Alliés, d'armes modernes, serait d'un excellent appoint dans la lutte contre le Japon. Elle possède une remarquable infrastructure aérienne, pour un pays d'Asie, et pour terminer elle permet, avec la baie de Camranh, de dominer les communications maritimes entre Formose au nord, Singapour au sud, les Philippines et Bornéo à l'est.

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C'est d'ailleurs de l'Indochine et de Camranh que le Japon a préparé et exécuté son attaque sur Bornéo, la Malaisie et plus indirectement sur Java et la Birmanie. C'est en effet dans la baie de Camranh qu'ont été rassemblés les grands convois de transports et de navires d'escorte qui ont attaqué Singapour - 650.000 tonnes - et Java - 450.000 tonnes. C'est dans la région de Saigon-Thudum - Soctrang etc.... que sont partis les avions qui ont coulé les "Prince of Wales" et "Repulse" et qui ont attaqué Singapour et Bornéo. C'est un rôle analogue qu'elle doit jouer entre les mains des Alliés, et non seulement vers le sud à partir de Camranh et de la Cochinchine mais à partir de Tourane, du Tonkin et de Kwang Tchou Wan vers la grande base japonaise de Hainan et de la sône cruciale de Canton-Hongkong dans le sud de la Chine. Sans même mentionner la possibilité de ravitailler aisément le sud de la Chine par les chemins de fer de Haiphong à Yunnanfou et de Hanoi à Langson. On ne saurait donc trop souligner l'importance stratégique de l'Indochine; sa importance politique au regard des autres collectivités "blanches" des Philippines et de Hongkong pour lesquelles elle est, en venant de l'ouest, le dernier relais et soutien. Et il serait certainement d'un rendement très supérieur d'achever d'équiper les forces françaises d'Indochine une fois libérées plutôt que d'équiper entièrement un effectif équivalent de troupes chinoises.

Si, pour éviter une lente progression le long de la ceinture d'îles du Sud-ouest du Pacifique, lente progression dont les opérations de Guadalcanal et de Nouvelle Guinée donnent une mesure néanmoins maximum, les Alliés doivent rechercher des bases plus rapprochées du Japon et des lignes de départ des alliés, on doit souligner qu'une attaque alliée, débouchant de l'Assam et axée sur la Birmanie, vient précisément toucher la Mer de Chine sur les Côtes d'Indochine dans la région de Camranh et sans être obligée de cheminer le long de la presqu'île immense de Malaisie où la progression risque d'être lente et difficile.

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Enfin il ne faut pas oublier que les Alliés trouveront en Indochine un potentiel de production de 60.000 tonnes de caoutchouc par an et des stocks importants de caoutchouc alors qu'il est probable que les Japonais, lorsqu'ils seront chassés de Malaisie et des Indes Néerlandaises, détruiront les installations de production de caoutchouc de ces pays. La même remarque vaut pour l'étain dont l'Indochine peut produire 2.000 tonnes par an et possède des stocks importants.

X X

X

On ne peut pas attendre actuellement de l'Indochine, livrée à elle-même comme l'est, une révolte spontanée et isolée contre l'occupation japonaise. Les esprits ne sont pas mûrs pour cela; l'armée ne dispose pas de l'armement moderne nécessaire - tanks, canons antitanks et avions - et le gouvernement s'opposerait à ce qui ne serait qu'une folie. Par ailleurs les conditions extérieures ne sont pas réunies qui permettraient d'appuyer efficacement et d'exploiter utilement une telle action interne. Bien au contraire il faut tout faire pour que rien n'excite la méfiance justifiée des Japonais et que rien ne les pousse à se saisir du contrôle complet de l'Indochine, de son administration et de ses forces armées. On doit tout faire pour prolonger dans toute la mesure du possible la situation actuelle qui conserve intact le potentiel de combat indochinois; et malheureusement on peut craindre que les événements qui se passent actuellement en Algérie et au Maroc n'incitent le Japon à prendre préventivement des mesures de précaution analogues à celles qu'Hitler vient de prendre en France et en Grèce.

X X

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Quelqu'il en soit, ni la France Combattante, ni les Alliés ne peuvent rien faire pour empêcher les Japonais de prendre ces mesures préventives. A tout le moins doivent-ils éviter à tout prix de fournir au Japon des prétextes de le faire: tels qu'organiser des guerillas à l'intérieur du territoire indochinois; monter des attaques prématurées contre ce territoire ou avec des forces chinoises; ou même seulement compromettre les organisations patriotes clandestines ou les personnalités indochinoises qui nous sont acquises.

L'Indochine ne pourra intervenir elle-même qu'en connexion étroite avec une action américano-anglaise contre son territoire et qu'après que la Mission Française de Chungking se sera assuré que l'atmosphère intérieure est mûre, avec les complicités voulues et d'ailleurs dès maintenant certaines.

Le rôle de la Mission Française est donc très important et le succès de l'action alliée reposera en partie sur la perfection du travail préalable du M.R. de Chungking. On peut se demander à cet égard si le Haut Commissaire de la France dans le Pacifique, actuellement à Nouméa, ne serait pas mieux placé à New Delhi qu'entre l'Indochine et le siège du Gouvernement français, que ce siège soit à Londres ou peut-être bientôt à Alger.

x x

x

L'action alliée aura donc probablement à aborder l'Indochine pour pouvoir utiliser cette place d'armes, remarquablement outillée pour l'Asie. Comment pourra-t-elle l'aborder, compte tenu de ses voies de communication et spécialement des nouvelles routes construites depuis novembre 1939?

Le croquis ci-dessous dégrossit le problème pour les frontières terrestres. Je renvoie à mes rapports spéciaux


FF 3975

- 5 -

pour les défenses côtières de l'Indochine et spécialement pour la zone du Cameroun.

Les centres importants de l'Indochine sont tous dans la zone côtière et sur sa façade maritime; ils sont séparés des frontières terrestres par des zones montagneuses, de parcours difficile sinon impossible et percées de voies d'accès peu nombreuses se développant dans des vallées étroites.

C'est ainsi que l'on peut dire que les seuls secteurs utiles des frontières terrestres, utiles pour aborder l'Indochine, sont les suivants:



FF 3925

- 6 -

a) le secteur N.E. entre Moncay et Lackay avec 4 voies de pénétration:

Moncay	"	Haiphong
Langson	"	Hanoi
Caobang	"	Hanoi
Lackay	"	Hanoi

et une voie de rocade le long et près de la frontière Tien Yen-Langson-Caobang.

Ces quatre voies sont bien défendues, ^{soigneusement} par des ouvrages bétonnés ~~montagneux~~ et les intervalles entre ces voies, très montagneux, sont d'un parcours impossible pour une route moderne, exception faite dans le secteur Langson Moncay où existe le couloir étroit emprunté par la route secondaire Phu Lang Tuong-Lam-Dinh Lap.

Le secteur entre le Fleuve Rouge à l'est et le Mékong à l'ouest est très difficile de parcours; il aboutit à une route secondaire ayant une faible capacité de trafic de Dien Bien Phu à Hanoi.

Le secteur du Haut Mékong jusqu'à Thakhek, couvert par le fleuve lui-même, est très montagneux et n'est desservi que par une route secondaire à faible capacité de trafic de Vientiane à Luang-Prabang vers Vinh.

b) le secteur du moyen Mékong, entre Thakhek et Pakse, couvert par le fleuve lui-même, n'est montagneux qu'en bordure de la plaine cotière à laquelle il accède par deux voies: une voie principale de Savunnakhet à Dongha, défendue par le point d'appui, faiblement organisé, de Tohépone et une voie secondaire de Thakhek à Vinh, de faible capacité de trafic.

Il est assez bien desservi du côté du Siam par la voie ferrée aboutissant à Oubone et il possède, du côté Indochine,

77 3125

- 7 -

l'excellente rocade routière de Thakhek, Savannakhet, Pakse, Stungtreng, Saigon; cette rocade, à proximité immédiate du Mékong, est très vulnérable à une attaque; elle vient d'être doublée en partie par la rocade intérieure de Muong Phine (près et à l'ouest de Tchépone), Saravane, Pakse. Ce secteur est difficile à défendre aéronautiquement car les aérodromes de Donghène, Tchépone et Saravane - à fortiori ceux de Pakse et Savannakhet - sont très près de la frontière et ceux de la côte en sont séparés par le difficile obstacle que constitue la chaîne annamitique.

Ce secteur a une importance considérable par le fait qu'une attaque en débouchant vers le sud et se gardant à Pakse dans les 2 directions de Saravane et Savannakhet et à Stungtreng dans la direction de Pleiku-Quinhon (la route principale Pleiku - Stungtreng ne sera pas achevée avant juillet 1943 au plus tôt) peut arriver en Cochinchine sur les arrières des forces défendant le Cambodge et menacer Saigon sans avoir à craindre aucune attaque sur les flancs jusqu'à Snoul, première transversale rencontrée.

c) le secteur assez étroit, de part et d'autre du grand lac, entre la chaîne des Dang Rek au nord et le massif de l'Elephant au sud. Ce secteur, de parcours facile, est desservi au nord du grand Lac par la route principale de Angkor à Phnom Penh avec embranchement direct sur Saigon par Kompong Cham; au sud du Grand Lac il est desservi par les chemins de fer et la route principale de Battambang à Phnom Penh.

x x

x

Les forces armées françaises sont actuellement déployées, pour leur majeure partie dans le secteur "a". Le secteur "b" n'est défendu que par une brigade. Le secteur "c" est actuellement dévolu aux Japonais et ne comporte évidemment aucune troupe. Ne pas oublier :-

FF 3975

- 8 -

- que les ponts ^{de Ha Noi} DOUAIER et de Thanhua commandent tout le trafic routier et ferroviaire du nord de l'Indochine

- que la circulation ferroviaire et routière entre Vinh et Phantliet, très vulnérable de la mer en de nombreux points, peut être coupée aux nombreux points qui livrent passage d'un delta à l'autre. Il n'y a que deux roades intérieures: Phanrang-Delat-Saigon et Qui-non-Pleiku-Banmethuot - Saigon.

Au surplus la France Combattante, par l'intermédiaire du Commandant J. L. Bourgois, a donné au Général Stilwell à Chungking et à la 10th U.S. Air Force à New Delhi les informations les plus complètes et les plus détaillées sur les organisations militaires Vichystes et Japonaises, terrestres et aériennes, de l'Indochine, ses voies de communication et ses objectifs militaires et industriels susceptibles de bombardements aériens.

Commandant Jean L. Bourgois
Ingénieur en Chef au Corps des
Ponts et Chaussées

700/001

Source: 696 a/1000/1/15.0.43.
Informations reçues les 30.3.43
Wilour: "A"

Informations du 15.3.43

"57 bombes avec 20 planeurs pouvant transporter 10 hommes chacun actuellement adressés de Boulogne-saint-Jacques de la Lande - Le Lande de main 37 nouveaux bombardiers avec planeurs du N° 51 à 58 - Ces avions seraient du type Dornier."

Informations du 16.3.43

"Actuellement en gare du Grand Miteron à Nantes, 70 locomotives destinées à remorquer trains de troupes et ouvriers pour l'Allemagne. De plus dans ports nombreux bateaux de guerre et de commerce à savoir un croiseur et 10 contre-torpilleurs tous puissamment armés et 2 torpilleurs en construction."

Informations du 24.3.43

REMARQUE -

Au cours du bombardement pas de D.C.A. active ni vu panique parmi les servants qui ont fui leurs postes - Très bon effet sur population vu les bons résultats acquis, pas une maison avoisinante touchée - Surprise de ne pas voir Usine Carpentier pas touchée alors qu'elle fabrique des munitions avec gros rendement pour ennemi."

Conclusion

Source: 640 A/ICRA/A/EC/5
 Informations de: SL.3.43
 Informations reçues de: SL.3.43

VALEUR : A

FF 3004

" Dans dépôt Kriegsmarine route de Lorient à BREST
 30 bâtiments encore debout contenant linge, caoutchucs, laine,
 teinture et essence ainsi que les anciens bâtiments anglais
 contenant diverses marchandises.

La caserne Mac Mahon au N.O. de la ville est remplie
 de tissu lainage et caoutchouc ainsi que deux compagnies de
 soldats revenant de Russie dont une de tankistes".

TESTIMONIAIRE :

6. 708

REF. 11.

FF 3000

Source : 661 a/BONA/A/NO-2.
 Informations de : Mars 1943.
 Informations reçues le : 31.3.1943.
 Valeur : A.

(Rectificatif à notre Source 64) a/BONA/A/NO-1.

Unité division blindée 336. Division Infanterie 166°.

26.3.1943 -

Eléments division ISOMMO signalés Nice toujours là
 mais rien de plus en ce moment.

Paquetot BOMA transféré portu avions dans fort Gênes.

Quatre sous-marins bloqués à Toulon. 1 seul tonnage sur
 5,120 tonnes. - Accusé 11 minutes comme retour croisière le 12 mars."

Destinataire :

2: 310

SECRET

An Outline of a Plan for Indo-China

I. General Remarks

The following is an attempt to set forth the most effective means we can use in Indo-China to aid in the achievement of our major goal in the Pacific theatre of war--the destruction of the Japanese armed forces. The most effective means we can use come under the heading of subversive measures, largely as a result of the complications arising from our present "friendly" relations with the Vichy government, and Vichy still exercises nominal sovereignty over Indo-China. If there should be a break with the Vichy government, some of the limitations of the following plan would be removed.

II. What we have to work with in Indo-China.

Fortunately, there exists a ready made weapon in the form of the Annamite Nationalist movement, one of the strongest and most violent organizations of its kind in all of Asia. This movement has been characterized in the past by numerous bloody uprisings, the use of terrorism as a political weapon and a well-organized, thoughtfully executed program of passive resistance and sabotage.

There are many other tribes--national or linguistic groups or both--in Indo-China which have, in times past, taken up arms in the interest of a Nationalistic cause. But these other groups are greatly inferior to the Annamites in terms of numbers, aggressiveness, organizational skill, tactical

knowledge and general cultural level. Thus, they are not under consideration here.

There are, roughly, 20,000 Annamites under arms as soldiers in the French army and there are thousands of others throughout the country who have hidden weapons. This was demonstrated as recently as last year when there occurred an uprising of such proportions as to necessitate the burning of scores of villages by the French Foreign Legion and the execution of numerous alleged leaders. The Annamites are fearless fighters, and in 1918 when there were more than 50,000 Annamite troops on the Western front, they demonstrated qualities described by an observer who knew them well as "courage, intelligence, endurance, discipline, resignation, avarice and a zeal for military decorations."

III. What the Annamites can do for us.

They can immobilize large numbers of Japanese troops by conducting systematic guerilla warfare in the difficult jungle country of Cochin China and numerous rubber plantations throughout all of Indo-China. The most fertile field for the recruitment of guerilla fighters is in the Red River delta where natural calamities, combined with over-population problems, have served to create an embittered and restless people. On February 10, 1930, troops (Annamite) of the Yenbui garrison, which controls the Red River delta and is made up mostly of its peoples, staged a singularly bloody revolt which was only suppressed after great efforts by the French. The revolt, like many others of its kind,

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was characterized by bomb throwing and guerrilla warfare. The Annamite nationalists are familiar with all the tactics of disrupting lines of communication, ambush of small detachments and assassination of important leaders.

IV. How they can be reached.

The Annamite nationalist leaders can be reached through two channels, both of them Chinese. Naturally, the movements of Occidental agents in Indo-China are restricted by reasons of conspicuousness, although even if this were not true it would still be difficult to surmount the distrust of the White man which forms one of the basic driving forces in the Nationalist movement.

The two Chinese intermediaries are: (1) The Foreign Intelligence Service of the Kuomintang (army or diplomatic); (2) The Chinese communists.

From what we were able to learn in Chungking last summer, it appears as if the Chinese intelligence service can move in and out of Indo-China at will, following the northern route from Tonkin to Kuming. They can either buy the Nationalist leaders outright or sell the more idealistic the idea that a victory for China really means "self-determination of peoples", "Asia for the Asiatics", etc. These intelligence agents would be aided in their plans by a statement from Chungking, preferably from the Generalissimo, to the effect that China has no demands, either now or in the future, on the Annamites.

-4-

The Chinese communists have excellent connections among the Annamites. In 1931, when the Communist Party was at its height, it numbered 1,500 members with 100,000 affiliated peasants although the unofficial figures today are probably five times that amount. The leader of this Annamite communist movement was trained in Canton under Borodin in addition to his extensive schooling in Moscow and various European countries. His name, Nguyen-Ai-Quec, is known to all Annamites. Chao En-lai, the Communist "ambassador" in Chungking would be the best contact in this connection.

Now there is still another way: Radio. The Japanese, before the occupation of Indo-China, distributed thousands of radio sets to the native population and sent out propaganda broadcasts in Annamite from Hainan. Even before this Japanese move, however, there existed many radios among the native populations as is evidenced by the fact that Radio Saigon gave many broadcasts daily in the Annamite tongue, news and features.

We could get our propaganda to them by medium wave from Chungking or India, but here again the question of our relations with Vichy at the time these broadcasts are made will influence the degree to which we are overtly associated with these programs. An excellent method would probably be to set up what would ostensibly be a genuine "freedom station".

-5-

V. What we can do to turn the Annamites against the Japanese.

1. We can begin with effective liaison work with the Chungking government and the Chinese communists BUT approach the Chinese communists only through the agency of the Kuomintang. This, of course, will be difficult, but in view of the improved relations between Chungking and the communists as a result of the German-Russian war and several other factors, it might not be impossible. It would be to China's interest to see a full scale native rebellion under way in Indo-China. If the Chinese government should prove to be reluctant to enlist the aid of the communists in this project, there are ways and means to approach Chao-En-Lai secretly. The only reason for considering the Chinese communists in the first place, is, as has been indicated above, because of their close connection with the Annamite nationalist movement.

2. We can give our intermediaries the necessary money and provide weapons to be smuggled in--although the Annamites (see above) still have a considerable number of firearms. Since our weapons, if captured, would of course point to us, we could exchange them for German equipment to China for their German equipment. We could also supply quantities of that excellent pistol.

The Annamites are more susceptible to cash.

-5-

which is saying a good deal.

3. We can give our intermediaries printed materials in Annamite to be smuggled in. Since more than 1/3 of the Annamite population is literate and the Annamites are susceptible to ideas, if simply stated, this suggestion might have considerable effect if carried out.

4. Radio Propaganda (see above).

VI. Propaganda Lines (subversive and overt).

The most effective propaganda line we can follow is to convince the Annamites that this war, if won by the Allies, will be the means through which they will gain their independence. Regardless of our own views on the subject of whether or not there should be a free and independent Annamite state, this line would be the quickest method of turning the energies of the Annamite nationalist movement towards our own ends. We should convince the Annamites that rule by the Japanese will mean a rule of terror and oppression such as the French had never conceived, or put in practice in the past. Here are some other lines:-

1. Japanese rule, since it is a rule by other Asiatic peoples, actually means the absorption of the Annamites as a race (the Annamite press has often expressed great concern on this particular point), the systematic destruction of all Annamite religious institutions (emphasizing contradictions between Shinto and the Buddhism of Indo-China) and the enslavement of the Annamite peoples.

2. Emphasize that the French, although they have been harsh masters, are benevolent despots in comparison to the Japanese. Cite the number of villages that had been razed, the numbers of Annamite leaders that had been executed, and the oppression that had been exercised by the French previous to Japanese occupation of Indo-China and stress that all these grievances are but a prelude to what the Annamites will suffer at the hands of the Japanese.

3. Tell them that every Japanese killed in Indo-China is a Japanese who won't have to be killed somewhere else and that the freedom of the Annamites depends upon the number of Japanese they can assassinate.

4. Although the Annamites have had good training in their dealings with the French it would be helpful to give them instructions, in detail, on the art of sabotage, industrial and agricultural.

Other lines of a non-subversive nature can be found in an FIS directive entitled, "A tentative plan for Indo-China". The implementation of the above scheme would certainly result in a great deal of difficulty for the Japanese army of occupation, and possibly native uprisings on a scale even larger than those which have been so costly to the French in times past.

DM

Chief, Budget and Personnel Branch, Lt. Colonel, USA
Executive Officer, USA
ATTORNEY GENERAL, USA, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

In accordance with the Special
Order No. 3, issued 11 April 1944, the follow-
ing named personnel in the Director's Office and
the Executive Office are authorized to initiate
actions on either Regular or Special Funds
personnel:

Lt. Colonel G. L. Dorrings, Jr.

Lt. (j.g.) Edwin J. Russell, Jr.

G. C. Dorrings, Jr.
Lt. Colonel, USA
Executive Officer

Lt. Putzell

Mrs. O'Donnell

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

INTEROFFICE MEMO

TO: Mrs. O'Donnell
Miss Rattigan

DATE: 13 April 1944

FROM: Secretariat

SUBJECT:

Colonel Gridley telephoned me today to say that the War Department frequently sends direct to OSS replies to papers which OSS has routed to the War Department through the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In such cases the Joint Chiefs do not know what action was taken on the matter.

Colonel Gridley requests that in the future we make sure that the Secretariat of the Joint Chiefs of Staff receives a copy of any such direct reply from the War Department. I take it that this does not refer to communications which we have originated directly with the War Department and have not routed through the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

CC's:

Col. Doering
Mr. Cheston
Lt. Putzell


William G. Lee
Major, AUS
Chief, Secretariat

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

INTEROFFICE MEMO

(DATE) 31 March 1946

TO: Major Lee
 FROM: Mrs. O'Donnell
 SUBJECT: E. J. Putzell, Jr.

Lt. Commander Ravenel, Naval Command Liaison Officer with the Navy Department, has asked that the Administration Building forward to the Naval Command a copy of all communications sent by the Director's Office to the Navy in order that the Naval Command may more intelligently and adequately service the organization.

It appears that frequently upon receipt of communications from OSS, officers of the Navy phone the Navy Command for further information or informal discussion and Commander Ravenel and his staff are in quite an unfortunate position by their complete ignorance of the matter under discussion.

I assured Commander Ravenel that all of us would comply with his request.

EJP
 E. J. Putzell, Jr.

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : General Donovan
FROM : Helen Clarke
SUBJECT: Registry Index Guide

DATE: 5/11/44

Enclosed please find copy of Registry
Index Guide as requested by you on
Saturday.

Helen Clarke

MO'D

THE INDEX ROOM

The functions of the Index Room are to accession and index all incoming and outgoing pouch and domestic reports and correspondence.

The purpose of this procedure is to acknowledge the receipt of a document and to maintain a lasting record in the card files of the information contained in the document for daily and future reference. From these cards one or more documents on a person or subject may be readily assembled for background analysis, comparison with other material or the compilation of a report. In addition, in cooperation with the Geographic desks, specific information required for their use, both now and in the future, is "caught" and recorded.

To accomplish this purpose two forms are used.

THE ACCESSION SHEET

Domestic: A daily chronological record of all new incoming material giving number, source, name of recipient, resume of information, classification and date.

Pouch: Each pouch has a separate accession sheet covering the Geographic Area concerned. The same procedure is followed as for the domestic.

INDEX CARDS

For both French and Portuguese Material

The Index card consists of number of document, title, category number, "blurb" or text, source and date.

Under the cross reference system in use the title of the Index card and the matching category number designate where the card is filed. The category number is determined by use of the Index Guide which contains the following main category headings:

General; Political; Economic; Military;
Naval; Aviation; Psychological and
Sociological; Subversive; Radio; Personnel.

Each of the above headings is broken down into sub-headings to encompass the subjects which fall into this category and has flexibility which permits the addition of new sub-headings as the need arises.

The "blurb" of the original card contains a condensed informative version of the document covering two salient points: type of data, locations involved, names and organizations mentioned and items of strategic interest.

Additional cards with the same "blurb" but with different and appropriate headings and matching category numbers are then made in order that each name and subject in a document may be noted and a card for this name or subject filed in the correct division in the card file.

By this system a document dealing with a variety of subjects is registered and from a variety of documents all information on a particular subject may be correlated.

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/10/18 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100240001-7

In cases where both subject and country are underlined, two cards should be made.

Disease	Am. typhus	Typhus	China	0-10
China	Typhus			0-10

When titles are followed by country-country, countries are listed alphabetically -

Relations	France-Germany	8-3
-----------	----------------	-----

Always be specific -

Questionnaire	Germany	Battle Order	0-1	
Map	Charts	France	Marseille	0-10-5
Germany	Berlin			1-0
Photographs	Japan	Tokyo		0-11-0
Strategic Material	Spain	Oil		8-20

Always qualify -

Oil	Expenditure	Automobiles	Country	0-15
Social Activities	X-2	Algiers		0-15-5

Always use first name and initial when given.

Remember - the purpose of the Index cards is to enable the file room to find a document quickly and easily, and to assist the Foreign Correspondence section to relate documents. Therefore, if a card contains a clear and comprehensive title with correctly used titles, it is of great value and will save many minutes of research.

GUIDE TO INDEX

O GENERAL

1. Questionnaire - country, specific

All requests for information.

2. Relations, country-country

Use only when more specific heading is not practicable.
(See 1-2, 2-2, 3-2, etc.).
Countries, alphabetically - France-Germany.

3. Information, country

Use only when more specific heading is not practicable.
(See 1-3, 2-3, 3-3, etc.)

4.

5.

6. List of Publications

List of pamphlets, books, etc. whose names have not been indexed under titles. (See 0-21, Titles).

7.

8.

9.

10. Frontiers, country-country

Economic and military activity, fortifications - customs restrictions. (See 2-10-1, 3-10-1).

11.

12. Civilian Defense, country

Air raid precautions, shelters and blackouts. National defense. Home and civilian guards.

0 ORIGINAL (continued)

15. Office of Strategic Services **OSI**

Addresses specific (APO - Fleet Postmaster)
 Points specific (Travel - Inoculations, etc.)
 Tables country or office (Algiers, Cairo, etc.)
 Sponsorship country or office
 Communications Name (Military and Naval)
 Communications country or country-country
 (Between OSI Offices)
 (For Personnel)

Trade Deferment Name	Specific	Country
Aviation	"	"
Communications	"	"
Chem and Poisons	"	"
Medicine	"	"
Maritime	"	"
Motor	"	"
Office	"	"
Personnel	"	"
Photographic	"	"
Printing	"	"
Sundry	"	"
Weapons	"	"

Expenditure	Specific	Country
Form	Specific	(Office and Administrative)
Mail	Specific	(British may be used here)
Telephone	Specific	(Use only if branch originating project is unknown).

Office Procedure	Specific	Country
Or Sanitation	Specific	(SI, SPO, TI, etc.)
Personnel	Branch	
Police	Specific	
Translations	Name	(SI, SPO, U, etc.)
Recruits	Branch	(Cover, etc.)
Security		(For agents)
Training School	Name or Country	(Report by OSI representative to foreign post)
Travel Conditions	to or in country	

All OSI activities, functions, etc. Subheading must always be qualified -- I.M.I. OSI ADJUTANT TRAVEL. OSI EQUIPMENT RATION COUNTRY.

1.

2. Number of cables and reports. Numbers.

For cables and report numbers. Number followed by source description only for reports, not cables.
 410 POLIO I INT'L. JOURNAL REPORT 0-12-48

0 GENERAL (continued)

13. (continued)--

3. Special activities - branch specific

AO	(Air Operations)	
FN	(Foreign Nationalities Branch)	
SI	(Secret Intelligence)	
SO	(Special Operations)	
SSO	(Strategic Services Operations)	
RA	(Research & Analysis)	
MO	(Mobile Operations)	MS (Medical Services)
WU	(Maritime Unit)	
PG	(Planning Group)	PPR (Personnel Procurement Branch)
CE	(Counter-Espionage)	
OG	(Operational Groups)	

Activities of branches of OSN - plans
and proposed projects not named or approved -
Always qualify SPECIAL ACTIVITIES BY JUNE 1968 0-13-3

4. Projects SI
5. Projects SSO
6. Projects MO
7. Projects WU or IA
8. Projects SSO
9. Projects OG

Approved and named projects -
Always qualify SSO Bluebell "2 0-13-3

14.

15. Individuals, names

1. OSN representatives (Name, Code Name or Cable Number)
OSN officials and agents in code book
2. When a person is member of State Department use 0-14-2
in conjunction with 0-15
0-15
0-15-2

6. GENERAL (continued)

15. (continued)--

3. Friendly contacts abroad - Name or Country

Cards on individual names are not filed under this category but may be used only in conjunction with 7-10 --

PHILIPPINE, ARABIC C-10
C-10-2

May be used on country card for long list of names not indexed individually, i.e.: FRANCE C-10-2

4. Post offices, country - name

Letter drops and names of persons transmitting mail between two countries, or within a country.

16. C C O I - name country

Companies, Corporations, Organizations, and Institutions. **USE ONLY** where more specific heading cannot be used. (See 1-22, 2-23, 5-12, 6-20, and 7-10 -- CCOI).

17.

18. Hunger and starvation, country

Only for famine, not shortages. (See 8-10-2. Commodities).

19. Disease and Pestilence, specific, country

Epidemics.

1. Sanitation and medicine, specific, country

Hospitals - shortages and public health

20. Geography, country

Detailed descriptions of countries, islands, etc.

1. Meteorology 2. Weather, country

2. Harbors - Ports, Beaches country

3. Terrain country

Also for road reports. (See 2-10, Transportation).

4. Oceanography country

5. Maps - Charts, country (town or section).

Include sketches, organization charts.

0. GENERAL (continued)

01. Titles

books, pamphlets, newspapers, magazines. Also ships, hotels, decorations and miscellaneous.

1. Microfilm
2. Photographs, country (town or section).
3. Motion pictures - title

Title where possible.

1. POLITICAL

- 1.
2. Relations, country-country
3. Information, country
- 4.
5. Government, U.S. or FOREIGN

Consulate
 Diplomatic Corps
 Embassy
 General
 Intelligence
 Local
 Police
 Political Personalities

Country, town
 " "
 " "
 " "
 " "
 " "
 " "

Use General only for documents or cables dealing with organization of a government as a whole. Use Local for Town Councils, Mayors, Prefects, Courts, etc.

U.S. Agencies & Departments Branch

State, ONI, Treasury, etc.

FOREIGN Ministry Branch

Foreign Affairs, ONI, etc.

6. Internal Revolt, country
 Uprisings, demonstrations of populace against the government.
7. Policy, country or country-country
 Foreign and domestic.
- 8.
9. Political & Administrative Notices & Orders, country
10. Neutrality, country
 Attempts to maintain. (See 1-13. Peace Aims).

2 POLITICAL (continued)

11. War Aim, Country

Over-all plans for conquest.

12. Peace Aim and Proposals, Country

Recorded - also plans and meetings.

13. Legislation, country

Law and restrictions.

14. Statutory rules and orders, country

As not made a crime by statute or law.

15. Government-in-exile, country of origin in country

Governments functioning outside country of origin.

16. Censorship - country

1. Intercepts.

Cables, letters, and reports.

17. Boundaries, country-country

Political and geographic limits or lines of demarcation -
political disputes pertaining thereto.

18. Land-lease, country to country

19. Nationals, nationality in country

Groups of persons of one country residing in another.

20. Opposition governments - country

21. Political prisoners, country

All prisoners or internees other than military.
(see 2-12-1, Prisoners).

1 POLITICAL (continued)

22. Political organizations, committees, parties and forces - name, country

Also groups, conferences, such as Tcheran, Qasbo, and Moscow where there are a great many parties, which are not listed separately. It is possible to use "Italian Political Parties" - country, or "French Political Parties" - country.

23. International or Allied Committees or Courts - name, country

Organizations set up to deal with political problems arising during or following hostilities.

24. Treaties and Agreements - countries concerned

Treaties or agreements, dealing with political matters, signed and ratified -- or talks, exchange of correspondence or negotiations leading up to such signature. Countries involved to be listed alphabetically, i.e.: England-Germany-Italy-Russia-United States.

25. Post War Planning - country

Political plans or projected policy within or controlled by one country/.

26. Claims - country

Claims of one country on territory or populations within the borders of another country/.

1. Territorial Compensations - country

Territory or populations given to a country in compensation for territory or populations detached.

2. Plebiscites - country

Plebiscites in disputed areas, etc.

27. Occupation or Provisional Government - country

Government of foreign occupying force, civilian, or provisional government supported by foreign occupying forces, i.e.: Bulgaria.

28. War Criminals - country

War criminals, their trials and judgments against them; Nazis, Fascists, quislings, collaborationists, etc. Groups or individuals.

E ECONOMIC

1.

2. Relations, country-country

1. Partner, country-country

3. Information, country

4.

5.

6.

7. Policy, country or country-country

3. Illegal Activity, country, specific

Black Market - Counterfeiting - Larceny - Craft, etc.

1. Smuggling, country to country, specific

Go violations - Arms. For persons, (see C-22 Underground).

9.

10. Communications, country - country, specific

-/r (Wireless, Telegraph) Telephone, and Postal

11.

12. Imports, country ^{from} country, specific

1. Import control, country by country, specific

13. Exports, country to country, specific

1. Export control, country by country, specific

14. Shipping, country

Merchant Marine & Cargo ships.

1. Port facilities, country

Docks - Anchorage

- 10 -

II ECONOMIC (continued)

15. Shipbuilding, country

Merchant ships construction - not Battleships, etc.
(See 4-11-1 S E T U)

16. Transportation, country, specific

Railroads, Roads, Canals, Rivers, and Airways.

1. Time tables, country

2. Traffic of goods - country to country

17. Industry, country, specific

War production, Commodities, Power Companies, etc.
(See 3-11-2 S E T U).

18. Agriculture, country, specific

19. Commodities, country, specific

Food, Fuel, and clothing. Material products and manufactured articles.

1. Conservation, country, specific

2. Substitutes, country, specific

Waste goods.

3. Shortages, country, specific

4. Rationing, country, specific

For Ration cards (See C-22-1 Document and Equipment).

20. Strategic materials, country, specific

All raw material used for war effort and industry.

21. ECONOMICS (continued)

21. Finance, country

Budgets - stock markets, etc.

- | | |
|------------------------------|--------------------|
| 1. <u>Foreign funds</u> | country |
| 2. <u>Investments</u> | country |
| 3. <u>Loans</u> | country |
| 4. <u>Transfer of funds</u> | country to country |
| 5. <u>Taxes</u> | country |
| 6. <u>Markets and prices</u> | country |
| 7. <u>Tariffs</u> | country |
| 8. <u>Profits</u> | country |
| 9. <u>Debits</u> | country |
| 10. <u>Insurance</u> | country |
| 11. <u>Exchange</u> | country |
| 12. <u>Currency</u> | country |
| 13. <u>Wages</u> | country |

22. Economic warfare, country-country

1. Black list, name of firm, country

23. C C O I, name, country

All economic and industrial firms and companies. Use name if possible; otherwise, for long lists use C C O I Country

24. Requirements, country, specific

1. Priorities, country, specific

25. Labor, country

All information pertaining to working classes.

1. Unemployment, country
2. Labor unions, Trade unions, country
Association of workers
3. Shortage, country
4. Forced labor, country of origin in country
5. Strikes - country

II. ECONOMIC (continued)

26. Control, country by country

POST WAR

30.

31. Treaties and agreements countries concerned trade

Treaties or agreements, or talks, exchange of correspondence or negotiations leading up to them, dealing with economic matters specifically arising out of war problems. Not re-negotiation of former treaties or agreements nor action taken by a single nation in relation to another, i.e.: un-freezing funds (See 2-21-1). Countries involved to be listed alphabetically as in 1-31.

32. Post War Planning; Country

Economic plans or projected policy within or controlled by one country.
i.e.: inflation control, fiscal policy, etc.

33. Claims country

Reparational claims for war damages; bombing, occupation, actual hostilities, etc., from individuals or countries.

34.

35. Exchange country to country industrial equipment

Negotiations for, and actual restoration of, industrial equipment, removed during war or occupation period, to country of origin.

MILITARY

1.

2. Relations, country-country3. Information, country

Also Battle Order. (See 2-14, disposition).

4. Insights, country of origin in country

Troops, material - trucks, etc.

5. Government, U.S. or FOREIGNCommittees

Main:

Joint Chiefs of Staff,
Military Missions, etc.Military Personnel Name

Generals, Officers, etc.

U.S. War Department Branch

Army, and Army Branches, such as Quartermaster,
Ordnance, etc. Headquarters, G-1, G-3, etc.
Military Attaché.

FOREIGN Ministry Branch

Army, and Army Branches, such as Wehrmacht, etc.

6. Rebellion, country

Uprising of Army.

7. Police, country or country-countryAlso used for T/O (Tentative Commander) priorities -
Transportation T/O (Table of organization),
T/E (Table of equipment),
T/A (Table of allotment).8. Operations, country

Training and maneuvers - War game.

1. Offensive, country

Second front - Invasion plans.

2. Defensive, country

Land fortifications - A/A, etc. (See 4-3-2, 5-3-2, Defense).

- 14 -

3 MILITARY (continued)

9. Chemical Warfare, country

Gas - protection against - gas masks.

10. Bacteriological warfare, country

Germ - poisons

11. Army, country

Particular Divisions or regiments - name or number, i.e.:
 The 60th Division, Blue Division, Foreign Legion,
 Commandos - Parachute Troops, etc.

1.

2. U S W, country, specific

Supplies - Equipment - Weapons - Material.
 Tanks, Guns, Munitions and parts, Secret Weapons,
 Uniforms, etc.

3. Conscription - Mobilization, country

Only military.

12. War, country-country

1. Prisoners, country from country

(only military (see 1-21. Political Prisoners).

2. Casualties, country

3. War effort, country, group

Guerrilla bands - name where possible - Partisans, Etc., etc.

4. Supporters, country from country

13. Orders, country

3. MILITARY (continued)

14. Disposition, nationality in country

Disposition of troops, divisions, etc.
Battle Order. (See 3-3 Information).

1. Movement of troops, country or country to country

Observed in transit through a country, or from one country to another.

2. Transfer of material country or country to country

War supplies.

POST WAR

10. International or Allied Committee or Courts Dealing with Disarmament

Military (or naval or air-force) organizations set up to deal with military (or naval or air-force) problems arising during or following hostilities.

11. Armistice or Surrender Terms Countries Concerned (Alphabetically)

Terms offered for cessation of hostilities by either side, or the acceptance of such terms, or actual laying-down-of-arms by conquered country or countries.

12. Post War Plans: Country Demobilization

Plans for, and actual, demobilization of Army.

13. Claims Country

Claims by veterans against the Government, or settlement of such claims, such as pensions, insurance, protection of rights, re-employment, etc. Legislation and proposals for veteran welfare.

14. Occupation Government Country

Military government of foreign occupying forces.
(See A. B. G.)

15. Exchange Country to country

Exchange of military or civilian prisoners of war, and allocation of confinement military war boat.

- 10 -

4 NAVAL

- 1.
2. Relations, country-country
3. Information, country
- 4.
5. Government, U.S. or FOREIGN

Committee
Naval Personnel

Name

U.S. Navy Department Branch

FOREIGN Ministry Branch

Name as 3-5 only for Naval Affairs.

6. Rebellion, country
mutiny.
7. Policy, country or country-country
8. Operations, country

See 3-8. Operations.

1. Offensive, country
Naval engagements

2. Defensive, country
Minors, submarine nets, etc.

9. Submarine activity, country or off country

Reversal and Factual.

1. Submarine bases, country
Existing and under construction
2. Refueling stations - country or off country
Ships or land.

17

4 NAVAL (continued)

11. Navy, country/

1. O E W II, country, specific

battleships, destroyers, submarines, Torpedoes,
Secret Weapons, etc.

POST WAR
PROGRAMS

50.

51.

52. Post War Program; Country Demobilization

plans for, and actual, demobilization of Navy.

- 10 -

ATTENTION

- 1.
2. Relations, country-country
3. Information, country
4. Airfields, country, town or section
5. Government, U.S. or FOREIGN

Committee
Airforce Personnel

Name

U.S. Airforce Department Branch
FUNCTION Ministry Branch

Same as 0-6 only for Airforce.

6. Air raids, country, town or section
Accomplished.
7. Policy, country, country-country
8. Operations, country
See 3-6 Operations.
 1. Offensive, country
Proposed plans and retaliation raids.
 2. Defensive, country
9. Civil aeronautics, country
Future plans for Air Control, Concessions by air line.
10. Combination, objectives, country, (town or section) specific.
Strategic installations, factories, rail and communication lines - ammunition dumps, Target information, etc.
11. S.L. 1, country, specific
Plans and parts, gliders and aerial bombs.

- 10 -

5 AVIATION (continued)

12. C C O I, name, country

Pan American, etc.

17. Transport schedule, country

Existing; and proposed. (See 8-0. Civil Aeronautics)

POST WAR

30.

31.

32. Post War Planning, Country Demobilization

Plans for, and actual, demobilization of Air-Force.

- 20 -

6 PSYCHOLOGICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL

- 1.
2. Relations, country-country
3. Information, country
 - Education - Housing - Welfare
- 4.
- 5.
- 6.
7. Policy, country or country-country
8. Psychological warfare, country by country
9. Foreign Relief and Rehabilitation, country by country
 - UNRRA plans.
10. Natives and Tribes, country, specific
 - Arabs, Moslems, Hindus, Kurds, etc.
- 11.
12. Opinion, country
 - Aims and policies of minorities and groups within country, such as Jews, Arabs, etc.
 - 1. Public opinion, country
 - 2. Individual opinion, country, name
 - Only use if person of importance.
13. Press, country
 - Excerpts - Clippings - Materials
14. Religion, country
 - (See 6-15. Catholicism)
15. Catholicism, country

6 PSYCHOLOGICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL (continued)

16. Jews, country

1. Anti-Semitism, country

17. Population, country

Also Census

- 1. Emigrants, country from country**
- 2. Immigration, country from country**
- 3. Visas - Passports - Travel Permits - country**

Use only one. For authorized visas, passports, etc.
 Need or reproductions for use of agents,
 (see 6-2E-1. Documents and Equipment.)

18. Refugees, country from country

1. Escaped Prisoners, nationality from country

19. Morale, country

Current state of country, populace or groups of individuals.

20. C O O I, name, country

Colleges, Churches, Relief Organizations. Names of
 assistance groups.

21. Atrocities, country

22. Underground, country

Used like Civil War Underground - Routes, Stations, and
 persons assisting in escapes.

1. Documents & Equipment, country, specific

Types of papers and clothes needed in enemy occupied
 countries by persons residing or travelling -
 Carte d'identite, laissez passer, etc.
 (See 6-17-3. Visas).

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6 PSYCHOLOGICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL (continued)

23. Resistance Groups, country

All resistance and underground groups and organizations working against occupation forces.
(Use in conjunction with G-20. C C O I if name given).

24.

25. Ethnic groups, country of country

Races or peoples.

POST WAR

30.

31.

32. Post War Planning, Country (Social reconstruction and re-education)

Plans for reconstruction of devastated areas, resettlement of homeless or evacuated populations, re-education of young, etc., within and by one country.
(International, see G-9, Foreign Relief etc.)

33.

34.

35. Exchange Country to country Works of art

Search for, and restoration of, works of art, etc., to original source.

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7 ~~ADMINISTRATIVE~~

- 1.
2. Relations, country-country
3. Information, country
- 4.
5. Government, U.S. or FOREIGN Intelligence Branch
 All Intelligence and Propaganda organizations.
 Also Contago & S. S., etc.
- 6.
7. Policy, country or country-country
- 8.
- 9.
- 10.
11. Activity, country by country
 Suspected and Factual.
 1. Subotage, country by country
 2. espionage, country by country
 3. Counter-espionage, country by country
 4. Equipment, country - specific
 Secret Ink - Explosive "Toys" - Soluble paper.
- 12.
- 13.
14. Propaganda, country by country
 Axis, United Nations, and Neutral Countries.
 1. Counter-propaganda, country, b. country

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7 SENSITIVE (continued)

15. C C O I, name, country

Suspect firms and organizations.

16. Individuals, name.

Suspects. Same procedure as O-15-3.

17. Codes - Ciphers, country

Use one only. Also identification of codes designation for ONS followed by Code name - -

Codes ONS Elephant Jackson
Codes ONS Jackson Elephant.

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8 RADIO

All the headings in this category are filed under subject headings except 0-3 information, those headings are self-explanatory.

- 1.
2. Relations, country-country
3. Information, country
- 4.
- 5.
- 6.
7. Policy, country or country-country
8. Equipment, country, specific
9. Clandestine stations, country
- 10.
11. Broadcasts, country to country
12. Monitoring, country
13. C C O I. Stations, name, country
14. Jamming and Interference, country
15. Distribution and Sales, country
16. Reception, country
17. Broadcast facilities, country, specific